Introduction & Summary Robinson, Rowley, Beck, Carroll, & Apperly, 2006) . Children also preferred to guess the outcome under epistemic rather than physical uncertainty (Robinson, Pendle, Rowley, Beck, & McColgan, 2009 ). We explored whether children's difficulties came about because they tended to imagine a possible outcome and treat this as if it is known. In two experiments we manipulated the ease with which children could imagine an outcome. When the outcome was more difficult to imagine children's overconfidence in the face of epistemic uncertainty was reduced.
Participants: 60 5-to 6-year-olds, within subjects design.
Procedure: Children placed a mat to catch an object falling from one of three doors in the Doors apparatus (Fig.1) . The door was determined by the throw of a die, which the child did not see. Two practice trials: Epistemic practice trial: mat is placed when object is hidden behind an unknown door. Physical practice trial: mat is placed before object is hidden behind an unknown door.
One experimental trial:
Children chose which way (epistemic/physical) to play the third trial
Two conditions
Participants: 29 5-to 6-year-olds, within subjects design.
Procedure: We used a two door version of the apparatus (Fig. 1) . We used only epistemic uncertainty trials: mat/s placed when object is hidden behind an unknown door. The experimenter decided where to place the object and children placed a mat tor mats to catch it.
Specified: children saw that the object to be hidden was a yellow pom pom and the experimenter referred to it as a pom pom throughout the trials. Unspecified: children did not know the identity of the object and the experimenter referred to it as 'something' throughout the trials. When tasks involved objects with known identity 5-and 6-year-olds behaved as if they were overconfident. They:
• showed the expected preference to guess under epistemic uncertainty rather than physical uncertainty (Exp 1)
• they tended to put out only one mat to catch a known object that could fall through one of two doors (Exp 2) However, when the object's identity was unknown they did not show the same preference and they were more likely to put out two mats.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Discussion

Two conditions
Specified: children saw that the object to be hidden was a yellow pom pom and the experimenter referred to it as a pom pom throughout the trials. Unspecified: children did not know the identity of the object and the experimenter referred to it as 'something' throughout the trials. The preference for epistemic uncertainty was reduced when the identity of the object was not known.
Results:
experimenter referred to it as 'something' throughout the trials. Children were consistent in the number of mats placed on any trial type. Children were more likely to place two mats in the unspecified condition than the specified condition. When the object was unknown, children were better able to handle the uncertainty by marking both possible outcomes.
Results
same preference and they were more likely to put out two mats.
We speculate that children imagine a possible outcome of an uncertain chance event. The ease with which they do this can lead to a metacognitive error, akin to fluency effects seen in adults (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009) 
